Remote voting can be an important element of direct democracy. The author of the book “The role of the Internet in the development of democracy in Poland” [1]Maria Nowina Konopka, Rola internetu w rozwoju demokracji w Polsce, Ośrodek MyśliPolitycznej, Wyższa Szkoła Biznesu – National-Louis University, Kraków – Nowy Sącz points out two main ways of it. The first is “Internet Voting at the Polling Place“, where voters cast their ballots in a specially prepared place, i.e. the election commission, using the Internet as a channel. On the other hand, there is “Remote Internet Voting“, where voters vote either from a “voting kiosk” or from a home computer connected to the Internet.
Although experts at MIT, one of the world’s most prestigious technical universities, have been critical of the use of blockchain for voting [2]https://www.csail.mit.edu/news/mit-experts-no-dont-use-blockchain-vote, projects are emerging to make this possible, such as Aragon Vocdoni. [3]https://aragon.org/vocdoni We would consider using this solution, but we will need to contact the developers to get to know this platform better.
Maria Nowina Konopka draws attention to the need for an appropriate process of full identification of an e-voter. On the one hand, the voter must be identified to allow only eligible persons to vote and not allow multiple valid votes, while on the other hand, there is a need to maintain the secrecy of the process.
Aragon Vocdoni advertises itself as “an easy and secure solution to all governance needs, supported by an auditable, censorship-resistant and anonymous digital voting protocol.” According to the project’s documentation, “the goal is to provide the tools to allow the political will of network participants to translate outward into real political capital, without sacrificing privacy”. [4]https://docs.vocdoni.io/#/ It seems that it should be possible to meet our goals using this solution, but more detailed analysis is needed.
The author of the book on the role of the Internet in the development of democracy in Poland also points to the figure of Miroslaw Kutylowski, professor at the Wroclaw University of Technology, who together with his team created a Polish model of visual cryptography for the needs of the electronic election process.
An important example of a country clearly leading the way in terms of IT development is Estonia, already mentioned in previous posts. In the autumn of 2002 the first local electronic elections could be held there. Thus, a digital revolution in elections and other forms of voting (e.g. referendums) is possible.
Attention should also be paid to the so-called electoral adjectives, namely universality, equality, secrecy, directness and proportionality. [5]https://pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wybory_pi%C4%99cioprzymiotnikowe These are required under the Constitution of the Republic of Poland for elections to the parliment.
They mean that every citizen should be able to participate in the election and is entitled to the same number of votes. Directness has two main aspects, namely voting in person and voting for the person directly running for office (although voting by mail and by proxy are also allowed).[6]http://swiadomywyborca.blogspot.com/2012/07/bezposredniosc.html
Proportionality requires that a political party or electoral coalition receive in each district a number of seats dependent on the number of votes received there, taking into account the electoral threshold. [7]http://swiadomywyborca.blogspot.com/2012/08/proporcjonalnosc.html Finally, the purpose of the secret ballot is to provide voters with complete anonymity in decision-making.[8]http://swiadomywyborca.blogspot.com/2012/08/tajnosc.html
In the case of a vote on a specific proposed law on our portal, only some of these adjectives would be valid. Universality is hard to achieve because of the digital exclusion of some citizens. Equality, i.e. providing one vote to each voter can be ensured, I write about this further on. Casting a vote would be realized through appropriate technical means, while proportionality does not apply in this case. Finally, secrecy should also be possible.
The way of how participants in an electronic vote are verified is important. There is a spectrum of solutions, ranging from those where multiple voting by the same person is possible, to those where such multiple voting is difficult, to full verification.
The easiest way to verify is to check email address, but many Internet users have more than one address. Moreover, there are services like “10 minute email” that allow you to set up a temporary address for registration purposes.
A slightly better protection is to use a phone number to which the corresponding SMS code arrives and, for example, to save the hash [9]https://techniczny.net/czym-jest-funkcja-hashujaca-skrotu/[10]https://pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Funkcja_skr%C3%B3tu in the database to prevent the phone number from being used again for registration. This solution has the advantage that with the current obligation to register phone numbers [11]https://bezprawnik.pl/rejestracja-telefonu-na-karte/, the procedure for obtaining a new SIM card takes longer than setting up a temporary email. Nevertheless, also in this case the user may have several accounts on the portal for several phone numbers. Moreover, users may be reluctant to provide their phone number at registration.
A much better verification is to perform a credential transfer to a bank account to unambiguously establish identity. Such a verification transfer is usually made for a symbolic 1 PLN [12]https://loando.pl/wpis/przelew-weryfikacyjny, but there are solutions where even the transfer itself is not necessary.[13]https://bluemedia.pl/oferta/potwierdzenie-tozsamosci-z-eid The user selects his bank, is redirected to the login window of the internet banking system, confirms the request for necessary data and authorizes it with an SMS code.
So what kind of identity verification could work on our portal? This is a topic for a more detailed analysis done by UX Research, which we intend to do soon.
References
↑1 | Maria Nowina Konopka, Rola internetu w rozwoju demokracji w Polsce, Ośrodek MyśliPolitycznej, Wyższa Szkoła Biznesu – National-Louis University, Kraków – Nowy Sącz |
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↑2 | https://www.csail.mit.edu/news/mit-experts-no-dont-use-blockchain-vote |
↑3 | https://aragon.org/vocdoni |
↑4 | https://docs.vocdoni.io/#/ |
↑5 | https://pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wybory_pi%C4%99cioprzymiotnikowe |
↑6 | http://swiadomywyborca.blogspot.com/2012/07/bezposredniosc.html |
↑7 | http://swiadomywyborca.blogspot.com/2012/08/proporcjonalnosc.html |
↑8 | http://swiadomywyborca.blogspot.com/2012/08/tajnosc.html |
↑9 | https://techniczny.net/czym-jest-funkcja-hashujaca-skrotu/ |
↑10 | https://pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Funkcja_skr%C3%B3tu |
↑11 | https://bezprawnik.pl/rejestracja-telefonu-na-karte/ |
↑12 | https://loando.pl/wpis/przelew-weryfikacyjny |
↑13 | https://bluemedia.pl/oferta/potwierdzenie-tozsamosci-z-eid |